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Adebayo Olukoshi* 
Changing Patterns 
of Politics in Africa 
 
THE LAST DECADE AND A HALF in Africa’s recent history have been marked by some 
dramatic and significant developments on the continent’s political terrain. These developments 
have been as varied as they have been contradictory. They have also constituted a major 
source of challenge to political theory as different schools of thought grapple with them in terms 
of their weight and meaning. As can be imagined, there is no consensus on the most 
appropriate approach for interpreting the changes that are taking place in the structure, content 
and dynamics of African politics; indeed, efforts at conceptualizing the changes have produced 
a veritable Tower of Babel, with commentators not only speaking in different tongues but 
frequently past one another. The sense of confusion which is prevalent in the literature is 
indicative as much of the complexity of the changes themselves as of the crisis of theory in the 
study of Africa (Mkandawire, 1996; 2002; Zeleza, 1997; Mamdani, 1999). The contradictoriness 
of the changes, at once inspiring hope and generating despair, has polarized the scholarly and 
policy communities into Afro-optimist and Afro-pessimist camps. But for all the insights which 
they may offer into the problems and prospects of progressive change in Africa, both the Afro-
pessimist and Afro-optimist frames are far too simplistic and subjective to serve as an enduring 
basis for capturing the dialectics of socio-political change and transformation. A more careful, 
historically-grounded interpretation of the changes occurring on the continent is, therefore 
needed, and for it to be useful, it should enable us to transcend the narrow and narrowing 
parameters that currently dominate the discourse on the processes and structures of change 
occurring in contemporary Africa.  
 
Dimensions of political change in contemporary Africa 
The changes that have taken place on the African political landscape over the last decade 
and a half have been multidimensional. They have occurred as much at the level of formal 
politics as in the arena of the informal processes that underpin the political system. They have 
been generated by factors internal to the political system and those external to it, necessitating 
a close attention to the contexts within which the changes are occurring. Furthermore, while 
domestic, local and national-level considerations are critical to the definition of the process of 
change, external factors and international actors also continue to play an important, even at 
some conjunctures determinant, role in shaping outcomes. Understandably, much of the 
attention which has been focused on political change in Africa has been concentrated on the 
formal institutions and procedures of politics, because these are both more visible and 
measurable. However, as is the case with politics elsewhere in the world, as important as 
institutions and procedures are, they do not tell the whole story in and of themselves. For this 
reason, it is important that attention be paid also to the processes that underpin and 
mould/remold formal institutions and procedures, including especially the actors and actresses 
whose actions –and inactions– give life to the political system. And this can be done without 
resort, as Chabal and Daloz (1999) do, to stereotyping African politics almost as a domain of 
abracadabra where the more one sees, the more mystified one becomes. 
The main features of the changes in African politics occurred over the last 15 years that have 
attracted the most attention in the literature include the following.  
The re-structuring of the terrain of political competition and governance: the decade of the 
1990s in African history was ushered in with popular street protests or pressures, which in many 
cases culminated in concerted efforts at reforming the institutions and procedures of politics and 
governance. Among the most interesting developments occurred as part of this reform effort 
were: the convocation of sovereign national conferences in many Francophone and Lusophone 
African countries; widespread constitutional reforms that resulted either in the amendment of 
existing constitutions or the production of entirely new ones; the end of single party/military rule; 
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the restoration of multiparty politics and the organization of multiparty elections; the embrace of 
the notion of independent electoral commissions; the adoption of widespread electoral reforms, 
including mixed list and proportional representation systems; the achievement by a significant 
number of countries of a peaceful alternation of power between ruling parties and their 
opponents; and the organization of repeat elections that have been identified by some as a 
critical indicator of democratic consolidation. These changes were designed to open up the 
political space, and in so doing, allow for greater competition in the struggle for political power. 
The ambition was to create a level playing field for all political actors, make government more 
representative and accountable, allow for greater popular participation in national governance, 
and enrich the public space as an autonomous arena for the articulation of popular aspirations 
and/or the canvassing of policy and political alternatives (see Olukoshi, 1998, for further 
details). Afro-optimists have mostly concentrated their attention on the improved prospects for 
the continent around the re-structuring of the political terrain. Some early commentators were 
even to assess the changes in terms which spoke of a second liberation or an African 
renaissance. An Afro-barometer project (see <www.afrobarometer.org>) designed to capture 
the progressive changes occurring was also promoted. However, Afro-pessimists have in the 
main read the changes with skepticism, pointing to their shortcomings and the problems of 
democratic consolidation that persist.  
The emergence of media pluralism: almost without exception, and as an integral part of the 
pressures for the opening up of the political space, the monopoly on media ownership exercised 
by the state was broken during the 1990s through the licensing by governments of private 
newspapers, radio stations (mostly FM stations) and television stations. Inroads were also made 
by digital satellite broadcasters and private Internet service providers. Apart from representing a 
radical departure from the situation previously prevailing, the development marked a new and 
important element in the promotion of political pluralism, governmental accountability, and 
popular participation (see Olukoshi, 1998; Fardon and Furniss, 2000; Hyden et al., 2002).  
The efflorescence of associational life: during the course of the last one and a half decades, 
across Africa there has been a massive growth in the number and range of civil associations 
active in various spheres of life at the local, national, sub-regional and continental levels. Mostly 
set up as non-governmental organisations, they were seen by many as symbolizing the re-birth 
and vitality of civil society, and therefore as critical to the unfolding process of democratisation 
on the continent. Equally important, the civic associations were seen by some scholars as 
central to the emergence of new political actors in Africa –actors who, by the fact of their 
insertion in the civic arena, played the critical role of underwriting the African democratic 
transition and thus contributed to the dawn of a new era in the affairs of the continent (Chazan, 
1982; 1983; Bratton, 1989; Diamond, 1994). 
The demise of the last vestiges of colonial rule and institutionalized racism in Africa: the 
persistence of (settler) colonialism in the Southern part of Africa and the institutionalized racial 
discrimination that went with it constituted the most important challenge to African nationalism 
and its agenda of the total liberation of the continent from foreign domination. Beginning with the 
independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, and culminating in the 1994 national elections in which the 
black majority in South Africa participated for the first time, the end of colonial rule and the 
collapse of formal apartheid unleashed new political forces and possibilities in the countries 
concerned. Within Southern Africa and in the rest of Africa, the development also unleashed 
new processes and alliances. If there was a perception that the unfinished business of national 
liberation prevented African countries from giving full attention to the challenges of overcoming 
their underdevelopment and dependence, the end of colonial rule and apartheid was interpreted 
as marking the end of an important phase in the history of the continent, and the beginning of a 
new one in which concerns about African unity and development would pre-dominate.  
The revival of regional cooperation and integration efforts: there was a marked increase, in 
the period from the beginning of the 1990s, in the tempo of activities designed to promote sub-
regional cooperation and integration in Africa both as an important exercise in its own right and 
as a building block towards pan-African economic unity. At the same time, new efforts were 
made to strengthen continental-level governance, as evidenced, among other things, by the 
enabling of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the outlawing by the 
defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) of the unlawful seizure of power and the exclusion 
from the counsels of the continental body of all governments installed other than by lawful 
means, the intensification of efforts at promoting pan-African conflict resolution 
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mechanisms/peace-keeping instruments, and the transformation of the OAU into a new African 
Union (AU) complete with a pan-African parliament, a pan-African judicial system, and a 
reinvigorated commission.  
The changing nature of inter-state relations: African countries attained independence in the 
1960s on the basis of the inviolability of the boundaries they inherited and strict non-interference 
in the internal affairs of one another. These principles were, by and large, respected for some 
30 years. In the 1990s, however, they began to be seriously questioned and challenged in the 
wake of the crises that engulfed the Great Lakes region of the continent, which culminated in 
the invasion and occupation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by armies from several 
African countries. Armed conflicts in a number of other countries, most notably Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, further eroded the principle of non-interference, as sub-regional peacekeeping 
efforts were undertaken in the face of the actual or imminent collapse of central governmental 
authority. The position is now broadly established that governments involved in massive and 
gross violations are not entitled to enjoy the principle of non-interference in the affairs of their 
countries.  
The politics of transitional justice: during the course of the 1990s, as part of the unfolding 
reform of political systems, various programmes were introduced to revisit the impact of the 
immediate authoritarian past with a view to establishing what had happened, who had 
responsibility, and what corrective measures could be taken in order to achieve national 
reconciliation. The first major experiment in this regard was undertaken in South Africa with its 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Various adaptations of the TRC model and/or 
principle were subsequently developed by several other countries, particularly those emerging 
from periods of violent conflict and prolonged military rule. There was also an experiment in 
Rwanda with the Gatchacha or community-based system of tackling and overcoming the legacy 
of the genocide which the country suffered.  
An increased United Nations role in African governance: the context of the 1990s also 
featured new developments in the political system connected to an increase in the profile of the 
United Nations family of organisations in the domestic governance processes of African 
countries, particularly those emerging from protracted conflicts. There were various dimensions 
to this increased profile, but perhaps the most prominent are the international war crime 
tribunals that were established primarily on the ideology of discouraging impunity and sending a 
strong signal to political actors about the need to respect human rights and internationally 
established rules of conduct in situations of violent conflict and war. 
The most evident and visible dimensions of change in African countries tell a substantial part 
of the story about the shifts that are occurring in the political systems of the countries of the 
continent. However, as far as they go, they only cover the obvious processes of change. Other 
less visible or measurable but nevertheless powerful dimensions of change which deserve to be 
factored into analyses, but which have not been sufficiently taken into account, include the fact 
that there have been significant demographic shifts in African countries which add up to project 
children and youths into a position of much greater prominence. With well over 50 per cent of 
the population of Africa made up of children and youths –a reason for which Africa is nowadays 
described as the “youngest” continent– a gradual but inevitable generational shift is occurring at 
several levels at the same time in the political system. The youth vote is perhaps the most 
important, easily recognised aspect of this development, but there is also the emergence into 
positions of leadership of a generation of politicians who did not directly experience colonial rule 
and were not directly part of the nationalist anti-colonial coalition. The implication of this shift for 
the agenda of politics is one area which remains under-researched beyond the early, self-
serving references made in the late 1980s/early 1990s in some western foreign policy circles to 
the emergence of a new set of renaissance leaders in East Africa, the Horn, and Southern 
Africa. By contrast, the impact that youth alienation and disaffection –often connected to 
prolonged unemployment– could have on the stability of African polities has attracted the 
attention of scholars and policy intellectuals concerned with developing alternative 
interpretations of the conflicts that resulted in the collapse of central governmental authority in 
countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. What is now referred to in some of 
the literature as the Youth Question in African politics constitutes an important dimension of 
change which addresses the core of the political system, including the process of constitution 
and renewal of citizenship, the social contract within which citizenship is articulated, the politics 
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of representation, and the legitimacy of government and state (Abdullah and Bangura, 1997; 
Abdullah, 2003; Mkandawire, 2002; Sesay, 2003). 
Also critical to the changing frame of politics in Africa is the rapid rate of urbanisation taking 
place across the continent and the intensive internal population migration associated with it. As 
with the demographic shifts taking place, urbanisation and internal population flows would seem 
to be challenging many of the assumptions and structures on which post-colonial political 
governance was built. In addition to the obvious rural-urban reconfiguration that is occurring, 
there is also the growing politics of “settlers” and “natives”, the revival of competing ethno-
regional/socio-cultural networks, the proliferation of urban gangs/armed militias/neighborhood 
vigilante groups, the spread of intolerance and xenophobia which also finds expression in 
policies that are hostile to “non-natives”, the increased challenges of social inclusion and 
service delivery for a rapidly growing urban population, the massive expansion of the 
boundaries of the informal sector and informal networks, and the spread of a new religiosity that 
ranges from the syncretic to the puritanical. The many different questions associated with the 
process of accelerated urbanisation have been refracted into the political system in the form of 
contestations around issues of citizenship, individual and group rights and entitlements, the role 
of the state and the nature of its political and policy capacities, the content and reach of social 
policy, the secular status of the state, and the entire spectrum of urban governance (Sesay, 
2003; Mamdani, 2001; Mkandawire, 2002). 
Post-independence politics in Africa was fashioned within the framework of the nationalist 
anti-colonial struggle that gathered steam in the period after the Second World War. The 
agenda of the anti-colonial nationalist coalition that ushered African countries into independence 
constituted the kernel of the social contract on the basis of which policy –political, economic and 
social– was developed. Almost without exception, a central role was reserved for the public 
sector in what has generally been described as the state-led or state interventionist post-
colonial model of accumulation. It was a model of accumulation which came with its own 
structure of incentives –of rewards and penalties to which the players in the polity responded for 
much of the period it lasted, namely, the first two decades of independence. The collapse of the 
state interventionist model in the course of the 1980s and the efforts at replacing it with a “free” 
market-based framework also translated into the alteration of the incentives system in the polity. 
However, the impact of this development for the patterns of politics has not been seriously 
researched beyond the early efforts, which, heavily ideologically-driven by one-sided pro-market 
partisanship, were limited to suggestions that the market-based system would produce a new 
middle class that, drilled in the competitive ways of the market, would pioneer the African 
transition to a new era of (true liberal) democracy.  
This perspective was connected to the view that the emergence of a vibrant civil society, 
defined as essential to sustainable democratisation, was the flipside of the free market system –
as much as liberal democracy itself. The important question of the ways in which the collapse of 
the state-led model of development, the prolonged socio-economic crises which African 
countries have experienced, and the externally-driven efforts at market reform have produced a 
new incentive structure and redefined the normative boundaries of politics, remains insufficiently 
researched beyond anecdotal observations. 
The various dimensions of change that have impacted on the pattern of politics in 
contemporary Africa have been the subject of competing interpretations to which we will return 
fully in this essay. The key point which is worth keeping in mind at this point is the fact that the 
dominant methodology that consists of seeking to establish a balance sheet of progress and 
regression has hardly been helpful in enabling students of contemporary African politics to 
capture the nuances of change. Often taken in isolation, rather than in their inter-
connectedness, and frequently treated episodically rather than as part of a broader historical 
flow, the various elements of change are also routinely assessed without an adequate attention 
to the context within which they are unfolding. A first step towards redressing the prevalent 
analytical gaps in the study of contemporary Africa necessitates a discussion of the context 
within which political change is being fashioned and unfolded. 
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The context of political change 
Irrespective of the interpretative weight which may be placed on the changes which have 
occurred on the African political landscape in the period since the onset of the 1980s, these 
changes have taken place in a context defined and characterized by:  
- A prolonged economic crisis which African governments were encouraged or outrightly 
pressured to redress through an equally prolonged programme of orthodox International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank structural adjustment that has already lasted over two 
decades, and which has failed to overcome the difficulties it was introduced to help with at 
the same time that it has created new complications of its own (Mkandawire and Olukoshi, 
1995; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). Economic crisis and decline, the state of 
maladjustment of African economies, the expansion of the informal sector, and the erosion of 
domestic policy autonomy and capacities, represent a critical component of the context 
within which politics is being restructured in Africa. 
- The end of the old East-West Cold War as it was once played out, a development 
symbolized by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of 
the Warsaw Pact, and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 
While it lasted, the Cold War had a major impact on the domestic politics of many African 
countries as the rival ideological blocs immersed themselves in the internal political 
dynamics of different countries in their quest to contain each other and retain/expand their 
spheres of influence. The end of the Cold War may not have meant the end of history or 
ideology, as was hastily suggested by some commentators; however, it altered an important 
geo-political factor around which a welter of strategies and interests had mushroomed in the 
domestic politics of African countries. Post-Cold War African politics involved a complex set 
of re-alignment of forces and interests, in ways that affected the pre-existing patterns of 
politics. 
- The significant weakening of the African state by a combination of factors, not least among 
them the distinctly anti-state market reform agenda promoted by the IMF, the World Bank 
and other donors. That agenda had the consequence not only of delegitimizing the state as 
an actor in the political economy, but also of eroding its capacities through a series of 
retrenchment measures that also served to fuel the brain drain, facilitate the erosion of the 
domestic policy system, and reduce Africa to the most under-governed region of the world. 
Given the central role that the African state assumed in every facet of the post-colonial 
political economy, the institutional decline and decay to which it was exposed represented a 
major development, which reverberated in all spheres of life –the economic, the socio-
cultural and the political (Mkandawire and Olukoshi, 1995; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). 
The politics of filling the voids created by state retrenchment, delegitimation and decay has 
been at the heart of some of the changes that have occurred over the last decade and a half 
or more, including the emergence of new actors/actresses of various kinds with 
competing/conflicting projects. 
- The widespread resort to violence and arms in managing domestic political conflicts or 
demonstrating disaffection. Connected to the end of the East-West Cold War and the 
retrenchment of the state in a manner which hobbled it, Africa witnessed the 
emergence/resurgence of conflicts, mostly of an intra-state type kind and with varying 
degrees of intensity. Some of the conflicts were carried over from the Cold War period, while 
others derived from grievances arising from other sources. The most spectacular and tragic 
of the conflicts had genocidal dimensions, while in many cases there was also the collapse 
of central governmental authority. Furthermore, in what some commentators presented as 
evidence of a new genre of wars, the conflicts departed from the traditional patterns in which 
professional armies were pitched against each other. Instead, armed civilian groups took on 
others and/or heavily factionalized professional armies. Also, the widespread recruitment 
and deployment of child soldiers represented another unique aspect of the conflicts, as did 
the terror and mayhem which was visited on unarmed civilian populations, especially in the 
rural areas. Lacking in ideological clarity or an alternative social project, these wars were 
easily dismissed by many as amounting to banditry at the interface of greed and grievance; 
in fact, they spoke a much more profound change associated with the emergence into 
political significance of a disaffected urban youth (Abdullah and Bangura, 1997; Abdullah, 
2003; Mkandawire, 2002; Mamdani, 2001; Sesay, 2003). 
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- The emergence of a Diaspora of recent migrants from Africa also constitutes an important 
contextual factor, which is growing in significance as the new Diaspora grows in influence as 
a constituency whose influence is refracted back into the domestic political processes 
unfolding in different countries. The process of the constitution of this new Diaspora is recent 
and still on-going, as a wave of professionals, many of them still in their prime, migrate for a 
variety of reasons to Europe and North America at the same time that many who left 
temporarily to study abroad also choose to stay away. Their weight in lobbying around 
issues of political reform and human rights in their host countries is growing, and their voice 
in the affairs of their home countries reverberates among some important constituencies. It is 
a mark of their growing influence that formal recognition has been conferred on them by the 
African Union.  
 
Dominant themes in the study of political change in Africa 
The main contextual factors that have shaped the content and practice of politics in 
contemporary Africa also provide pointers to the themes that have preoccupied students of the 
process of change on the continent over the last decade and half. These themes vary in their 
details, but they can be summarised as including the following broad issues:  
- Transition and electoral politics, including party and electoral systems, programmes 
promoted by political parties, the process of electioneering, the quality of access to the 
media enjoyed by the competing parties, the legislative structure adopted, voter education 
and turnout, and judicial independence. 
- The problems and prospects of democratic consolidation on the basis of various competing 
frameworks for assessing and measuring the African transition. 
- Constitutionalism and constitutional reform, encompassing the basic rights of citizenry, 
separation of powers, administrative decentralization, and political succession. 
- The emergence, significance and role of an African civil society in the process of 
democratization. 
- The nature of state politics, the dynamics of state-society relations, and the challenges of 
governance facing African countries.  
- The causes, dimensions and consequences of contemporary African conflicts. 
- The political economy of reform in Africa, with particular emphasis on the interface between 
market reforms and political liberalisation, “good” governance, and public sector reforms. 
Easily, the bulk of the literature produced on African politics over the last decade and a half 
is focused on these broad themes. While the commonality of issues covered might suggest a 
convergence on the critical markers of change in African political systems, in reality there is 
diversity in the interpretative frames employed for reaching conclusions about the direction of 
politics. It is to these competing interpretations to which we now turn attention.  
 
Interpreting political change in Africa 
Of the various competing interpretations of the content, context and dynamics of political 
change in Africa, by far the most influential is the so-called new political economy/public choice 
approach which incorporates different shades of theories of patrimonialism/neo-patrimonialism, 
state criminalisation and post-colony (Bates, 1981; Jackson and Roseburg, 1983; Callaghy, 
1984; Kasfir, 1984; Young and Turner, 1985; Ergas, 1987; Chabal, 1988; Rothchild and 
Chazan, 1988; Carter Centre, 1989a; 1989b; Bayart, 1993; Bratton and van der Walle, 1994; 
Reno, 1995; Bayart et al., 1999; Mbembe, 1992a; 1992b). Depending on the particular angle or 
entry point they choose, scholars working within this broad approach have tended to pitch 
themselves into an interpretative frame that is either optimistic or pessimistic about the patterns 
of politics in Africa, their problems and prospects. The literature demonstrates a wide spectrum 
of opinion, but the main issues that have emerged to constitute the dominant approach to 
interpreting African politics and the changes taking place within it can be illustrated with the 
discussion that has taken place on the socio-economic context of political change and the 
nature of civil society.  
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With regard to the socio-economic context of political change, by far the most dominant 
perspective is that rent-seeking behavioural patterns among political actors and neo-patrimonial 
pressures produced the decline in African economies, obstructed the full realisation of the goals 
of IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes, nurtures a culture of 
informality/conviviality, and prevents the emergence of reform-minded coalitions able to initiate 
and govern far-reaching change in the form of economic and political liberalisation. For some of 
the contributors to the development of this perspective, rent-seeking is integral to the very 
nature of African culture and/or society, while for others the political/policy elite are the self-
conscious producers of niches of opportunity which they exploit. Some of the rent-seeking 
niches are also held to arise from the nature of African economies, which have been structured 
within a state-interventionist model of development that allocates an important role to the 
exercise of policy discretion, facilitates oligopolistic practices, and discourages the emergence 
of market-driven pricing regimes. As to the neo-patrimonialist pressures that are considered to 
be a pervasive, all-encompassing feature of African polities, some of the contributors to the 
development of this perspective locate the pressures at the level of African society itself, while 
others place the emphasis on the internal workings of the state system. The society-centric 
approach, best illustrated by Bayart’s notion of the politics of the belly, points to practices and 
norms in African society that prevent the embrace and sustained application of “rational” policy 
choices capable of promoting economic development and political liberalisation. By contrast, the 
state-centric approach locates the problem of neo-patrimonialism not in the society but in the 
state itself, pointing to the ways in which the state constitutes a burden on society on account of 
the politics of predation which it nurtures. In this connection, various theses of the shadow state 
or the state within the state have been advanced. Neo-patrimonialist pressures are also fuelled 
by the insatiable craving of the power elite for popular legitimacy. For this reason, layers and 
networks of patron-clientelism pervade the entire socio-economic and political system.  
Irrespective of the particular point of view taken by different authors on the sources of rent-
seeking and neo-patrimonialism, there is widespread agreement among them that Africa’s 
economic development and political transition from authoritarian rule have been stymied and 
obstructed. The intellectual roots of Afro-pessimism can be traced to this perspective insofar as 
it represents a frame which, in treating rent-seeking behaviours, neo-patrimonialist practices 
and post-colony syndromes as ubiquitous and all-pervasive, almost sees no way out of the 
“dead end” to African development. For, if existing policy frames have failed because of the 
adverse consequences of the logic of rent-seeking, the economy of affection, the politics of the 
post-colony, and neo-patrimonialism, reform efforts have also foundered for the same reasons. 
It was partly in a bid to overcome the pessimism that is the logical outcome of this perspective, 
that Chabal and Daloz (1999) suggested that the way things are in Africa as captured in the 
critique of the rent-seeking/neo-patrimonialist school should be accepted as the way Africa 
really works –in contradistinction to the orderliness in-built into Western state-society relations 
and structures. Although their intervention was presented as a departure from a euro-centric 
reading of Africa at work, it did not in fact succeed in going beyond the euro-centrism that was 
the object of their criticism, and in the end, their prognosis was also overwhelmed by a sense of 
pessimism.  
Those who –while still working within the rent-seeking/neo-patrimonialist framework– seek 
sources of hope and optimism, have had to turn to the an earlier generation of writings which 
saw in the orthodox economic reform efforts promoted by the IMF and the World Bank the 
possibility of the emergence of new patterns of politics in Africa that are allegedly more 
promoting of rational economic development and political renewal (Chazan, 1982; 1983; 
Diamond, 1994; Bates, 1981; Nelson, 1990). The arguments that have been marshalled in this 
regard are varied, but they frequently include the expectation that economic structural 
adjustment will produce or is producing a new bourgeoisie that is rooted in production and 
disciplined in the ways of the market so as to be in a position to mid-wife a genuine democratic 
transition in Africa. Others have suggested that the market reform process has empowered a 
new generation of technocrats who have become important players not only with regard to the 
struggle for the rational governance of economies, but also the restructuring of the parameters 
of politics. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the expectation that economic reforms will 
alter the structure of incentives in favor of rural Africa will not only increase the political weight of 
the rural populace in the national power equation of African countries, but also throw up new 
grassroots players who can serve as the voice of the people. Attention has also been payed to 
the changing patterns of interest group politics, especially the contestation between so-called 
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pro-reform (that is, pro-market reform) groups and anti-reform coalitions (often assumed to be 
people fully immersed in the rent-seeking/neo-patrimonialist logic of the post-colony), and the 
new patterns of politics which they are producing in the quest for rational economic 
development and political liberalisation.  
When it comes to the question of the African civil society, a theme to which a considerable 
amount of literature has been devoted, the polarisation between the Afro-pessimists and Afro-
optimists is equally in evidence (Chazan, 1983). While the bulk of the literature notes the 
expansion occurred in the course of the 1980s and 1990s in African associational life, the extent 
to which civil society represents a new, important arena or vector of politics is very much in 
contention. Some scholars contest the relevance of the concept of civil society to an African 
context that is still dominated by primordial ties and networks, while others point to the “uncivil” 
nature of African civil society, the dominance of a statist logic within it, and the proliferation of 
neo-patrimonialist relations that add up to limit its democratising potential. Others, however, 
take a more favorable view of African civil society, affirming the relevance/applicability of the 
concept to the African setting and suggesting that a process of socio-political renewal is 
underway across the continent that is underwritten by the principal civil society players. 
Furthermore, civil society, defined primarily in terms of an associational life that is autonomous 
of the state, is presented as evidence of the emergence of a new non-statist type of politics, 
with the leaders of the civic associations becoming the standard-bearers of the struggle for a 
democratic renewal that is anchored in the promotion of pluralism, secularism, civic duties, civil 
liberties/human rights, and the accountability of public office holders.  
 
Pitfalls of the dominant interpretative frames 
Although the dominant rent-seeking/neo-patrimonialist framework which includes most of the 
efforts at interpreting political change in Africa may have offered some insights into problems of 
political reform and transition on the continent, it is replete with weaknesses which limit its utility 
for capturing the nuances of change (Mamdani, 1999; Zeleza, 1997; Mkandawire, 1996; 
Makandawire and Olukoshi, 1995). These weaknesses are, in part, internal to the framework 
itself, including the fact that it has been deployed to serve as a universally valid explanation for 
just about anything and everything, thereby ultimately losing its analytic value and precision. 
Other weaknesses of the framework derive from the manner of structuring and the 
methodological approaches of mainstream African Studies, which consist of:  
- A continuing treatment of Africa and African politics as an exotic terrain that is replete with 
surprises, the bizarre and the Byzantine, and which pre-disposes students to sensationalism, 
exaggeration, condescension and even contempt in the way they handle the subjects of their 
research. It is little wonder that this approach has frequently resulted in the generation of the 
most inappropriate of notions about Africa, notions that, in the worst cases, are reminiscent 
of racist colonial anthropological approaches to understanding and characterising the 
“other”. 
- The construction and application of standards of assessment and measurement which tend 
to stereotype, in the African setting, practices and experiences which elsewhere are treated 
as routine, normal, or an exceptional aberration that is not worthy of special attention. The 
consequence is that in discussions about African politics, an excessive sense of déjà vu 
tends to predominate, thereby diminishing the struggles for change that take place, or 
minimizing the dimensions of change that does occur. 
- A persistent reading of African historical experiences using the lenses of the histories and 
experiences of other peoples and regions of the world in what some scholars, at an earlier 
phase of debates on the methodology of African Studies, described as a heavily euro-centric 
unilinear evolutionism that holds that whatever Africa may be experiencing presently is little 
more than a replay of a similar phase in a much earlier period in the history of Europe or the 
West. By the same logic, Africa’s future is seen as sensible and valid only if it is modelled 
along the lines of the political institutions of European countries. In consequence, attention to 
the specificity of the African context and historical experience, and the challenges for 
creativity and originality which they present, are lost in the analysis which is produced. In 
failing to assess African politics, economy and society on their own terms as distinct from the 
terms emanating from the history of others, unilinear evolutionism has served as an 
98 
 
instrument for a search, wittingly or unwittingly, for uniformity and conformity; it has not 
served the cause of diversity and universality. 
- The unrealistic application of the principles of orthodox economics to the analysis of African 
politics, in an approach which also places a great deal of emphasis on quantitative 
measurements to the detriment of qualitative analyses. This problem is reflective, in part at 
least, of a movement within the discipline of political science to mimic the discipline of 
economics at a time when the latter is enjoying a hegemonic position in the social sciences 
and the orthodox stream within the discipline is on the ascendancy. The result has been that 
formulaic correlations are being applied to the study of Africa which are both diversionary 
and fail to capture the nuances of political change on the continent. 
- The continuing analysis of African politics, economy and society on the basis of binary 
oppositions that separate and treat as distinct the formal and the informal, the private and 
the public, the state and the market, the rural and the urban, and the state and (civil) society. 
Yet, such rigid compartmentalisations are hardly useful for understanding the logic of politics 
in a setting where most actors/actresses straddle the distinct boxes on the basis of which an 
effort is made to understand them. Where attempts have been made to overcome this 
weakness, they have often produced outcomes that either attribute failure to the fact of 
straddling, or caricature straddling as one of the features of the exotic nature of African 
politics. 
- The outright denial or complete neglect of the existence of a political community in Africa 
that is characterised by diversity, contestation, sacrifice and visions of a better society. The 
rent-seeking/neo-patrimonialist discourse on Africa is carried out as though all Africans are 
collectively and uniformly immersed in that logic, with all actions, including those that simply 
happen by chance or which are the products of particular conjunctures, treated as the results 
of premeditated, self-serving neo-patrimonial calculations. This approach obviously limits the 
capacity of students to pay serious attention to the struggles that give meaning to politics in 
contemporary Africa and which propel the process of change.  
In addition to the weaknesses of the rent-seeking/neo-patrimonialist framework for 
understanding the changing patterns of African politics, the perspectives that it has generated 
have not been helpful in grasping the complexities of change on the continent. In this 
connection, the debate between the Afro-optimists and Afro-pessimists, characterized as it is by 
a host of subjectivities, has tended to be diversionary insofar as social progress is a 
contradictory process distinguished by setbacks, stalemates, and advances in a process which 
is not unilinear or unidirectional. The dialectic of decomposition and recomposition as a fact of 
human society is one that has been factored out of the Afro-pessimist/Afro-optimist debate, and 
the ideals against which positions are taken either to be upbeat or downbeat about the 
prospects for Africa are mostly the products of a wishful thinking that does not correspond to 
any known historical experience. Where such ideals are abandoned, an excessive realism is 
brought into play by an all-round lowering of standards, which is encouraged in a manner that 
suggests that not much more can be expected from Africa. But, in fact, people in Africa also 
dream dreams, have visions of a greater tomorrow, and want to hold themselves and their 
governments to the highest standards of performance. It is only when this simple fact is fully 
appreciated that we can properly begin to grapple with the dialectic of change in contemporary 
African politics without being trapped by the Afro-pessimist/Afro-optimist divide. 
 
Elements for an alternative interpretation of political change in Africa 
In seeking alternative interpretative frames for understanding the new patterns of politics in 
Africa, it is important, as a starting point, to keep in mind that change is a continuous process. 
Change is also not always radical –indeed, in most cases, it is gradual, often incomplete, 
certainly far from being total, and is sometimes even imperceptible but nevertheless occurring. It 
is precisely because of the permanence of change that much of the processes integral to 
politics, economy and society across the world constitute pieces of work in progress, arenas 
where –be it the management of diversity, the construction of the state, the negotiation of 
citizenship, etc.– the best models which are available or which correspond to the social 
equilibrium of the moment still represent, in a historical perspective, an unfinished business.  
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That is why, wherever there is change, elements of continuity also abound. Change unfolds 
more often than not in the womb of one form or another of continuity. The forces that serve as 
the bearers of change are the makers of history, but they may sometimes be immersed enough 
in the tasks at hand or the demands of the moment as not to be fully aware of the epoch-making 
nature of their actions or omissions. In other words, change is not always the product of a 
consciously defined project, and even where an element of deliberation and planning is 
involved, outcomes are not as predictable as might be imagined. What all of this calls for is a 
historical perspective and methodology which is able to locate isolated events and episodes in 
their proper place in the flow of a welter of events. Only such an approach can enable us to fully 
grasp the significance of change that is occurring and to develop a process based on an 
understanding of history. As noted earlier, the process of change is, by definition, a 
contradictory one; assessing the process cannot be helped by intellectual swings from 
pessimism to optimism and back according to the pressures and contradictions thrown up at 
different moments.  
African politics, as indeed politics elsewhere in the world, are in a permanent state of 
evolution. The current phase of the process of change in the politics of the continent is by 
definition contradictory and far from being unilinear or unidirectional. Indeed, considering that it 
is a process of change that is occurring at a time of massive decomposition and recomposition 
of social relations, it can be rightly argued that the continent is in a state of flux that is, at once, 
both confusing and ordered –often an admixture of both at the same time. The immediate 
context of the change that is taking place can be located in the collapse at the end of the 
1970s/beginning of the 1980s of the post-colonial framework of accumulation on the basis of 
which various players within the polity constituted themselves and/or were constituted. It was a 
framework in which the state took a frontline role in the key socio-economic and political 
processes of the polity; it was also organic to the social contract on the basis of which the 
nationalist anti-colonial coalition that ushered African countries to independence was 
constructed. Furthermore, it was critical to the intensive recomposition of social relations and 
politics that included the acceleration of the process of class formation and class differentiation. 
The ideological slogan that underpinned the framework was that of nation-building. 
Governments, therefore, invested heavily in the promotion of national unity, although in most 
cases ethno-regional identities remained strong and overlapped with class and religious 
identities.  
The reasons for the collapse of the post-colonial model of accumulation are already too well 
established in the literature to bear repeating here. What is important to note for now is that the 
collapse of the framework produced a rupture that called for a re-definition of state-society 
relations, as well as relations within society and the state themselves. The quest for this all-
round definition of relations was inevitably tied to the competition for re-positioning by the 
various contending interests in the political system and the struggle for power, opportunity and 
advantage among them. In this struggle, all the resources that are critical to the acquisition and 
retention of power have been mobilised, whether these be class-based or simply ethnic, 
religious and regional. The struggle also served as the context for critical stocktaking as 
manifested in the (sovereign) national conferences that were convened, the constitutional 
review exercises that took place, and the truth and reconciliation exercises that were launched.  
These different activities provided the occasion for the discontents of the post-colonial 
framework of accumulation and the politics that corresponded to them to be played out in the 
open. Their outcome, almost uniformly, comprised the formal abandonment of the authoritarian 
political systems, hitherto established in the form of single-party or military rule, and/or a 
military-civilian diarchy. In place of the old systems of political governance, multiparty regimes 
were introduced almost as the new complement of the economic liberalisation exercises 
associated with the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes that were introduced at 
the onset of the crisis of the post-colonial model of accumulation.  
If the crisis of the post-colonial model of accumulation translated into a crisis for the 
established political order in most African countries, the struggle for the preservation of interests 
became an important feature of the transition from political authoritarianism to political 
liberalisation, a struggle made all the more critical for the key social players by the continuing 
environment of prolonged economic crises and structural adjustment that under-girded the 
transition. A process of re-alignment of interests was also launched, including the forging of new 
identities and alliances. In this process –and in a classic demonstration of the dialectics of 
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change and continuity– yesterday’s single-party barons and military oligarchs became part of 
the movement for political pluralism and the expansion of the public space, by setting up or 
taking an active role in new political parties, non-governmental organisations, the religious 
associations that proliferated, and the numerous ethno-regional networks that were revived. 
Similarly, popular social movements, including trade unions, rediscovered their voices in the 
framework of the political liberalisation process. The inter-generational politics that mushroomed 
around the collapse of the post-colonial model of accumulation and the deep-seated socio-
economic crises associated with it also threw up various youth groups and associations which 
openly staked claims on power and resources in the name of a younger generation of Africans. 
Their campaigns were bolstered by the demographic shifts that had occurred in Africa in favor 
of the younger generation. Women’s groups also joined in the politics of voice and alliance-
building in a bid to secure a better representation in the evolving new political system. As the 
old middle class that was nurtured in the framework of the post-colonial model of accumulation 
saw its ranks thinned out and gradually faded into decline, a new middle class thrown up by the 
market liberalisation reforms that were introduced began to emerge as part of a broader 
process of social recomposition and transformation. In the politics of re-alignment that were 
unleashed, no sector of society was left untouched, and the massive mobilisation that was 
embarked upon by the forces of change and the vested interests which remained around the 
ancien régime constituted the stuff of which transitional politics was made in the 1990s. That 
period was also easily one of the more exciting in post-independence African politics, prompting 
some to suggest, rather hastily and prematurely, that the continent was in the throes of a 
second liberation.  
Amidst the politics of change associated with the end of the post-colonial model of 
development and the search for a new model, a new social equilibrium seemed to be in the 
making. But it was one whose emergence, in many parts of Africa, was both tortured and 
conflicted-ridden, sometimes taking on unimaginably violent dimensions. Part of the reason for 
this is the heightened uncertainty that was associated with the transitional process as the 
political liberalisation project was born in the context of the most prolonged and deep-seated 
socio-economic crises in the contemporary history of the continent. This state of uncertainty was 
heightened by a severe loss of confidence in the public institutions of government, especially in 
terms of their capacity to respond to basic citizen needs. Matters were not helped in this regard 
by the fact that the state, which once played a pivotal role in the polity, had, thanks to the single-
minded anti-statism of IMF/World Bank structural adjustment, been weakened, hobbled and 
reduced to a shadow of itself. And yet, with the context of economic decline and structural 
adjustment having equally undermined and weakened a broad cross-section of social groups, 
the state, even in its situation of decline, still remained an important point of focus in the 
articulation of livelihood strategies, the (re)definition of interests and the promotion of alternative 
social projects. This was as true for groups that were closely connected to the post-colonial 
model of development –and many of which were hardest hit by the collapse of the framework– 
as for those that were generally less inserted into a state-led developmentalism. It is also true 
for the emerging new interests thrown up by the market reform process. It is for this reason that 
the politics of transition have been characterised by an admixture of resistance, adaptation, 
alliance-building and transformation.  
The transition in African politics is also taking place at a time of expansion of the boundaries 
of informalisation. On account of the prolonged economic crises to which African countries were 
exposed, many formal processes and institutions went into decline and decay. Informal sector 
activities were boosted by the adoption of multiple modes of livelihood by the working poor and 
the erstwhile middle class. The intensification of the process of urbanisation also added to the 
pressures for the expansion of the informal sector. With the extension of the coverage and 
reach of the informal sector went the intensification of straddling with all the accompanying 
implications. Furthermore, the social reshuffling that is still underway in most countries produces 
both an element of ad hocism in the actions of interest groups and an unusual rapidity in the 
turnover of alliances. For these reasons, transitional politics have not associated with sharp 
ideological cleavages, even if the contestation for power has been intense and a range of 
critical issues centering on the restructuring of the state and state-society relations are being 
articulated in the public domain. If anything, the pursuit of multiple modes of livelihood within the 
context of an expanding informal sector has contributed to the emergence and/or revival of 
“traditional” social networks and a generalised religious fervor.  
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Concluding remarks 
Overall, the transitional process has registered important new shifts in African politics which 
ought to be acknowledged for their significance in Africa’s post-independence history. Of these 
shifts, perhaps the most important are the embrace by most of the key players of a multi-party 
liberal constitutional framework for managing political competition, the expansion and 
pluralisation of the public space, the open discussion of strategies for governing national 
diversities, and the emergence into prominence of non-state actors. But these changes have 
also been tempered by the deepening socio-economic inequalities occurring in most countries, 
the continuing toll exacted by the prolonged economic crises on the continent, the narrowing of 
opportunities for social advancement by the deflationary macro-economic framework promoted 
by the international financial institutions, the stagnation of national economies, and the 
continuing incapacitation of the state as a public institution. With the investments which have 
been made by various groups in the project of democratic reform failing to yield some of the 
socio-economic dividends that could have been expected, it should not be surprising that across 
Africa the citizenship question has emerged as perhaps the single most important issue around 
which the struggle for change has crystallized. Within this broad question, the issue of youth 
disaffection has come to the fore. It is a question that speaks to the fact that although the old, 
post-colonial model of accumulation and the social contract that was built on it may have 
exhausted themselves, the new market-based model of development whose basic blueprints 
were laid in the structural adjustment model of the IMF and the World Bank, amidst popular 
opposition, is yet to serve as an acceptable or workable framework for the constitution of a new 
social contract. The question which arises now is that, given the failure of two decades of 
structural adjustment to stem the decline in African economies (indeed, the adjustment 
programme became part and parcel of the dynamics of the continent’s economic crises), is it 
capable of being a basis for the construction of a new social contract, or must the continent now 
simply count the costs of its maladjustment and develop an alternative framework for its 
development? This is both a research and policy question, and it is one which scholars like 
Mkandawire have recently been addressing through their arguments for a project of 
developmental democracy as a framework for restoring Africa to a path of economic growth that 
is also by definition socially inclusive and democratic. It is an issue to which students should be 
encouraged to pay closer attention through the investment of theoretical and empirical effort, in 
the hope that such an investment can enable us to go beyond the morass into which African 
Studies find themselves. 
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